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Abstract  
 
Although almost eight years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, researchers continue to investigate the consequences of this far-reaching event in a 
variety of scientific disciplines and subject areas. In economic research, a number of more 
recent publications have added to existing body of literature by elucidating the medium- 
and long-term impact of the attacks using new methods and/or data.    
 
This paper is more modest in scope in that it reviews the impact of the attacks on the 
Manhattan's office inventory, employment and rents. Overall, there is scant evidence that 
the attack have had a long-lasting impact on the Manhattan office market. Of the 
companies that decided not to return to Lower Manhattan after 9/11, the majority 
relocated to Midtown Manhattan. Taken together, the core markets of Midtown and 
Downtown Manhattan captured about 80 percent of the stream of displaced tenants after 
9/11, while areas outside of these two core clusters captured only 20 percent, which 
bodes well for Manhattan’s ability to remain a prime office location even in the face of a 
severe crisis. The majority of businesses directly affected by the attack have opted to 
remain in the Downtown area or have returned there after the damaged buildings were 
restored. Moreover, the set of so-called "trophy" buildings proved to be less affected by 
the recession than the general market, a finding that runs counter to initial assumptions 
about the future of office high-rises. In addition to a drastic reduction in leased space, 
accommodation of displaced tenants within the existing office space portfolio of large 
companies contributed further to lower occupancy rates than had been expected after the 
destruction of 10 percent of the inventory. This phenomenon, also known as backfill, 
caused overall absorption to be negative in the quarters following 9/11, since the positive 
demand created by displaced tenants was more than offset by losses incurred in the 
accelerated recession.  
 
 
 
 
 
The aftermath of 9/11 in the New York office market 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
The September 11 attack obliterated 13.4 million square feet of office space in the World 
Trade Center (WTC) complex and seriously damaged at least another 17.8 million square 
feet in 23 surrounding buildings, affecting approximately 31.2 million square feet, or 10 
percent of the total stock of Manhattan office space. Nearly 100,000 office workers were 
subsequently dispersed to over 1000 different destinations, many of them within 
Manhattan and a few as far away as London and Tokyo. The secondary consequences and 
potential economic ripple effects of the attack on Lower Manhattan and New York City as 
a whole are more difficult to grasp than the immediate impact. Over the years since 9/11, 
it has become evident that initial speculation about a mass exodus of office companies 
from Manhattan has been unfounded. There are concerns nevertheless that the long-term 
effects of 9/11 will pose a continuing threat to Lower Manhattan’s economic health. The 
principal objective of this paper is to elucidate the impact of the September 11 attack on 
the New York office market by using exploratory data analysis.  
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack, a number of important studies 
have been published, documenting the damage and giving detailed accounts of the 
whereabouts of displaced tenants (see, for example, Kelly 2002). This paper presents a 
reevaluation of the impact of 9/11 on the New York office market more than seven years 
after the recovery process began. It describes the immediate impact of 9/11 on office 
inventory, absorption, vacancy rates, rent and office employment by means of an 
exploratory data analysis.  
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The immediate impact of 9/11 
 
Beyond the tragic loss of three thousand human lives, it is the physical destruction of the 
World Trade Center buildings that comes to mind when we think about the impact of the 
9/11 attack. The New York City comptroller estimates the property damage at $34 billion 
for both the destroyed World Trade Center complex and the surrounding buildings that 
sustained serious damage. In a more comprehensive study conducted by NYCPCC, the New 
York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce (2001), a gross loss of $83 billion through 
2003 is estimated as a consequence of the 9/11 attack, consisting of $30 billion in capital 
loss, $14 billion in cleanup costs and a compound $39 billion loss of economic output. 
From these gross costs we deduct insurance payments and emergency funds managed by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal agencies to 
estimate the net loss to the city's economy incurred by the attack. The federal funds are 
intended to defray the cost of cleanup and guide the economic recovery process. Although 
the exact sum of all funds and compensation payments actually disbursed by insurance 
carriers and federal relief organizations are not fully known, the NYCPCC estimates the 
overall net loss due to the 9/11 attack at $16 billion (4 percent of the gross annual output 
of Manhattan).  
 
Estimating the effects of 9/11 on the office market  
Any attempt to measure the impact of 9/11 on the job market, on the stock market, or on 
fiscal revenues is faced with the difficulty of separating the effects of 9/11 from the 
impact of a wider economic recession and other simultaneous events influencing the 
market. In the case of the office market, disentangling and isolating the effects of 9/11 
seems easier because of certain inherent characteristics of real estate markets.  Among 
others, Fuerst (2005) and Dermisi (2007) present empirical analyses of the impact on the 
New York and Chicago office markets respectively and find that the impact on rents was 
significant but limited to certain types of buildings and locations. In an analysis of indirect 
real estate investments, Kallberg et al (2008) examine the impact of the attacks on REIT 
prices and returns and find that initial abnormal returns of New York-related REITs 
disappeared within two months as analysts and investors revised their expectations.  
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As pointed out in the introduction, this paper does not provide an econometric analysis 
that attempts to isolate the impact of the attacks but rather focuses on exploratory data 
analysis drawing together data from a variety of sources. The impact on the supply of 
office space is clearly discernable thanks to available data on the World Trade Center 
buildings themselves and on the damaged buildings that were gradually returned to the 
market after restoration.  
To aid the analysis, it is useful to recall some of the general facts on how office markets 
operate.  The office market is typically conceived of as a system of at least three 
interlinked markets: a space market (also called 'user market'), a financial asset market, 
and a development market. The space market incorporates the demand for office space 
by tenants and the determination of rents. The amount of occupied space as the principal 
measure of demand for office space is a function of the number of office workers, the 
average space per office worker in a given market, and output of office firms. While 
employment and output are major determinants of the absolute amount of required office 
space, the space per office worker depends on the level of rental rates (price elasticity of 
demand), in the sense that higher rents entail a more efficient space use and hence less 
space per worker. Typically, rental rates are a lagged variable, however, since short-run 
demand is relatively inelastic to changes in rental rates. Most equilibrium models of the 
office market assume that only a certain proportion of the adjustment towards the 
hypothetical steady state takes place each period. The net change in occupied space from 
one period to the next (called space absorption) is another example of only partial 
adjustment to a hypothetical equilibrium value caused by imperfections inherent in the 
office market. Rental rates are determined in the space market as a function of the 
occupancy rate or its inverse, the vacancy rate. Similar to labor market economics and its 
concept of a 'natural unemployment rate', real estate economics defines a 'natural 
vacancy rate' as market equilibrium at which rents remain stable. If the actual vacancy 
rate falls below the natural vacancy rate, rents will rise and vice versa. Despite a number 
of theoretical problems associated with it, this concept proved useful in many empirical 
studies (Rosen 1984; Shilling, Sirmans, and Corgel 1987). It originates from the observation 
that real estate markets do not conform to the basic economic theorem that equilibrium 
is reached when supply equals demand and markets clear completely. Frictions and 
imperfections as well as the need for a sufficiently large fluctuation reserve are 
frequently cited as factors that impede complete market clearing. The magnitude of the 
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natural vacancy rate is not fixed, however, but varies across markets - owing to local 
market characteristics, and within a market over time, owing to long-run changes in local 
market characteristics (Wheaton and Torto 1994).  
The stock of office space, albeit fixed in the short run, can be expanded in response to 
increasing demand for office space, thus linking the space market with the development 
market and in turn also with the financial asset market. According to investment theory, 
construction of new office space at a particular site becomes feasible when the expected 
asset price of the building exceeds its replacement cost. The asset price of the building is 
a function of the net operating income (NOI) of a building, or more accurately, the 
present discounted value of the expected future income stream (net of tax and expenses), 
which is mainly a function of rental rates. The three main components to use in 
estimating the asset price of a building are thus rent, vacancy and the capitalization rate, 
which is determined by dividing the property's NOI by its purchase price. New construction 
is determined by all the factors making up the expected asset price as well as additional 
measures for estimating replacement cost. Variables used to estimate costs are typically 
the cost of capital (interest rates) and construction costs. Construction of new space is 
subject with particularly long lags, however, because assembling, financing and 
permitting along with actual construction are all extremely time-consuming processes.   
The effects of the 9/11 attack enter into this system simultaneously at various points: 
first, by reducing the total stock of office space; and second, by reducing the number of 
office workers and the amount of occupied space through movements of displaced 
tenants. These changes affect in turn the long-run equilibrium rent level (through the 
changed vacancy rate) and the overall feasibility of new space construction (through 
changes in rental rates and arguably also through higher construction costs because of 
additional security requirements for office buildings). The following sections analyze the 
effects of 9/11 on the various parts of the office market in more detail.  
 
The impact on office inventory  
The total amount of office space affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack is estimated at 31.1 
million square feet of which 13.4 million were completely destroyed and 17.7 million were 
found to be severely damaged (Table 1). Destroyed were the seven buildings of the World 
Trade Center, which included the two landmark towers with a total square footage of 4.7 
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million square feet of office space each, and five other buildings ranging from 600,000 to 
2 million square feet in size. Also destroyed was the Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty 
Street.  To put the numbers in perspective, the destroyed space equals roughly the entire 
office stock of the city of Detroit. When the comparison is limited to prime office space, 
the damaged and destroyed space equals the inventory of major office locations such as 
Atlanta and Miami (Jones Lang Lasalle 2001). In the New York City office market, 
however, because of its vast size, the affected space makes up approximately 10 percent 
of the total inventory of New York City though roughly 60 percent of Downtown's Class A 
space. 1 
 
Table 1: Destroyed and damaged office space by quality class. Data: Grubb & Ellis 2001 
Destroyed Buildings Size (Square feet) Occupied (Square feet) Class 
1 WTC  4.761,416 4.507,467 A 
2 WTC 4,761,416 4,576,215 A 
7 WTC 2,000,000 2,000,000 A 
1 Bankers Trust Plaza 1,415,086 1,415,086 A 
5 WTC 783,520 780,873 A 
4 WTC 576,000 561,491 A 
6 WTC 537,694 537,694 A 
DESTROYED TOTAL 13,420,046 12,963,740  
Damaged Buildings Size (Square feet) Occupied (Square feet) Class 
2 WFC 2,591,244 2,006,577 A 
3 WFC 2,263,855 2,167,611 A 
1 Liberty Plaza 2,121,437 1,874,584 A 
4 WFC 2,083,555 2,073,615 A 
1 WFC 1,461,365 702,999 A 
101 Barclay 1,226,000 1,226,000 A 
140 West 1,171,540 1,171,540 B 
100 Church 1,032,000 822,642 B 
90 Church 950,000 950,000 B 
22 Cortland 668,110 625,282 B 
90 West 350,000 350,000 A 
125 Barclay 273,900 273,900 C 
130 Cedar 135,000 135,000 C 
DAMAGED TOTAL 17,743,092 15,794,836  
OVERALL TOTAL 31,163,138 28,758,576  
 
                                           
1  Figures of the total inventory of office space differ widely among providers of market data because of diverging definitions of 
geographic areas and types of buildings. Total inventory figures used in this study are based on the definition and data by Grubb 
& Ellis.  
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Figure 1: Map of World Trade Center area. (Source: City of New York) 
 
Often criticized as a white elephant of an office complex whose construction was clearly 
not justified by the demands of the marketplace, the World Trade Center remained 
largely vacant and unprofitable in the first years of its existence. The largest portion of 
space was occupied by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and by various 
governmental institutions. Deriving its economic rationale from the principle known as 
Say’s Law (supply creates its own demand), the World Trade Center was constructed with 
the intention of boosting the economic development of New York in a time of economic 
recession, weakening demand, and high vacancy rates. Because it was delivered to the 
market at an unfavorable time, however, the addition of more than 10 million square feet 
of office space to the existing inventory served to depress the market further. It took 
more than six years for the office market to adjust to the supply shock induced by the 
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World Trade Center. During the 1980s, when the business climate in New York City 
became more favorable, the WTC complex developed a reputation as an attractive 
location for financial services companies with a need for large floor plates. Eventually it 
achieved an estimated ratio of 90 percent to 10 percent of private- versus public- sector 
tenants. The stock market crash of 1987 initiated a protracted period of decline for the 
Lower Manhattan office market; vacancies soared to 25 percent and higher. By the end of 
the 1990s, however, the combined effect of a tech boom and exceptionally strong growth 
in the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) industries had helped Lower Manhattan to 
once again overcome the crisis and achieve historically high office occupancy rates and 
rents. At the end of 2000 the market began to soften gradually, but it was not until after 
September 11, 2001 that Lower Manhattan experienced large-scale job losses and a severe 
office market recession.  
 
In the wake of the 9/11 attack, a number of market analysts, predicting that the 
reduction in space would lead to extremely low vacancy rates, saw landlords as being "in 
the driver’s seat" (Grubb & Ellis 2001) in the lease negotiation process. To the surprise of 
most market observers, however, demand for office space weakened significantly despite 
the large-scale loss of office space.  Three reasons for the unexpected drop in demand 
can be identified: a pronounced decline in office jobs owing to the combined effects of 
9/11 and economic recession; the availability of large amounts of unused space at various 
locations throughout Manhattan not reported as vacant in the market statistics ("shadow 
space"); and reduced space per worker in higher-priced target submarkets and revised 
expectations for the future growth and space needs of office tenants. 
 
The impact on leasing activity and absorption 
The relocation patterns of larger private companies occupying at least 20,000 square feet 
of office space in the buildings destroyed or damaged on 9/11 have been recorded by the 
real estate services and brokerage firm Grubb & Ellis. This subset of displaced tenants 
accounts for roughly one third of the total occupied space of the affected buildings. The 
remaining two thirds of occupied space comprise large private companies with missing 
data, smaller private tenants and government institutions. Hugh Kelly (2002, 26) tracked 
the movements of displaced public-sector tenants occupying 1.7 million square feet in all 
affected buildings and found that only 30 percent remained downtown; the rest relocated 
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to Midtown. Data are scarce on the approximately 500 small companies occupying less 
than 10,000 square feet and public tenants accounted for about 8 million square feet in 
the WTC. Kelly who was able to obtain and analyze a limited dataset of the smaller 
tenants, found that small companies displaced by the 9/11 attack were far more likely to 
remain in the downtown area than the large companies, thus accounting for about half of 
the overall space leased downtown to displaced tenants. This pattern could be explained 
by the fact that larger tenants typically require large floor plates and sizable amounts of 
contiguous space, which only a few buildings in Lower Manhattan could provide on short 
notice after the destruction of the World Trade Center. The search process for suitable 
office space was arguably shorter for smaller companies since more matching possibilities 
existed within a short distance from the original location.  
Kelly (2002, 25-29) reports that Lower Manhattan retained about 50 percent of the large 
private-sector tenants. Taken together, the core markets of midtown and downtown 
Manhattan captured about 80 percent of the stream of displaced tenants through 
reoccupation of restored buildings, backfill and new leases. The nearby office 
agglomerations along the New Jersey waterfront, which had been developing into a back 
office market for Wall Street and Lower Manhattan long before 9/11, managed to attract 
most of the relatively few tenants who opted to leave Manhattan. It is interesting to note 
that none of the other four boroughs of New York City outside of Manhattan was able to 
capture a significant percentage of displaced tenants especially when compared to the 
New Jersey waterfront. 
As of September 2003, a number of large tenants of the buildings that were damaged in 
the 9/11 attack returned to these buildings after they were restored (Newmark and 
Company Real Estate 2003). The remaining portion of office space damaged in the attack 
thus remained either vacant or was occupied by new tenants. According to a survey of 
Newmark and Company, more than half of the originally displaced tenants had returned to 
a Downtown location during the first two years following the attack and less than one fifth 
of the displaced tenants had decided to lease space permanently at a non-Manhattan 
location. These numbers are reassuring in terms of tenant retention in the restored 
damaged buildings and the downtown area as a whole, but it still remains to be seen 
whether tenants who have returned will opt to renew leases that expire in the next few 
years. Since some tenants were given the opportunity to break their leases after 9/11, 
The aftermath of 9/11 in the New York office market 
 
 11 
owing to interruption-of-services clauses in their contracts, the percentage of tenants 
choosing to discontinue their lease later on is generally expected to be low. As far as the 
wider Downtown area is concerned, however, the large number of leases expiring in 2004 
and 2005 (36 million square feet, or roughly one-third of the inventory) poses a potential 
problem, especially since the process of rebuilding the World Trade Center and restoring 
the economic potential of the area will continue well beyond 2010. Given the fact that 
more than half of the Downtown leases expire between 2004 and 2007 (Newmark & 
Company Real Estate 2003), around 200,000 jobs would be at risk of leaving the area. On 
the other hand, some factors work in favor of a recovery of Lower Manhattan. The 
restoration of transportation infrastructure, particularly of the PATH commuter train 
station, is expected to have a moderating impact on the potential job losses since it 
facilitates the movement of suburban workers into the city, thus enhancing Lower 
Manhattan's profile as an attractive location and giving the area the much-needed rapid 
access to a large pool of skilled labor. Moreover, an array of subsidies has been put in 
place to make the area more competitive. Tax deductions and accelerated depreciation 
benefits are available to businesses with fewer than 200 employees in the so-called 
Liberty Zone. Further support is available through the small firm attraction and retention 
grant program. Certain commercial buildings are eligible for real estate tax abatements 
and rent tax elimination or reduction for up to five years. The programs require that 
landlords to pass on any benefits received under the auspices of these revitalization 
incentives to tenants by reducing rents proportionally.  
Besides those tenants who chose to reoccupy previously damaged buildings, a number of 
new leases were signed in Manhattan, and in some cases in other locations, by tenants of 
destroyed buildings or tenants of restored buildings who were unwilling to return. 
Moreover, a considerable proportion of larger tenants of the space affected by 9/11 could 
be accommodated in excess space available at other locations of the same company. An 
estimated $341 million of rental income is lost due to backfilling displaced tenants into 
unused space at a different location (DRI-WEFA 2002, 37). The high percentage of unused 
space or shadow space among the larger multi-location tenants not accounted for in any 
market statistics revealed that vacancy and availability rates were generally understated. 
Therefore, displaced tenants who were accommodated within space that was rented but 
previously not used by the same company did not contribute to positive absorption in the 
market statistics.  
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Shadow space is widespread in office markets and is generally attributed to inflexibilities 
arising from the long-term nature of office leases. Shadow space builds up when 
companies incorrectly estimate the number of employees and their space usage over the 
time of the lease term. Estimates of the amount of shadow space in Manhattan differ 
greatly since there are no reliable measurement methods available. Mitchell Stier, 
chairman of Julien Studley Inc. estimates 10 million to 14 million square feet of shadow 
office space in Manhattan in the fall of 2003 (quoted in Realtors Commercial Alliance 
2003) while other sources claim that if shadow space were accounted for, reported 
vacancy rates would have to be adjusted upwards by 20 to 37 percent in some Manhattan 
submarkets (Holusha 2003).  
Although more transparency is typically associated with a higher degree of market 
efficiency, some argue that the existence of shadow space generates positive effects as 
well. By being kept of the market, goes the argument, the vacant space does not 
exacerbate the downturn phase in the market cycle. Since this space is in fact excluded 
from the ratio of supply to demand that determines price, shadow space should work 
towards stabilizing the market. In other words, since shadow space is rented out and 
typically not offered on the market, such space –although de facto vacant, should not 
affect market conditions in a negative way. Two points have to be considered, however, 
regarding the validity of this argument. First, companies will fill up their shadow space 
before they lease any additional space. Consequently, shadow space does affect the office 
market indirectly by potentially delaying market recovery after a recession. Second, some 
of the unused space may indeed be available for sublease, even though it is not officially 
listed. Transactions of this kind are typically made when brokers possess insider 
knowledge of unofficially vacant space and approach the main tenant to find out whether 
the vacant space would be suitable for sublease to other companies. 
More recently, changes to the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) adopted in 
2003 strictly require companies to record the write-off of unused space once a company 
has formally acknowledged that a certain percentage of its leased space is not being used. 
The unintended consequence of this change is that office tenants have an additional 
incentive to keep unoccupied space off the market. Under previous regulations, office 
tenants were flexible with regard to both the definition of what constitutes unused space 
and the timing of the write-off in their accounting reports. While the previous accounting 
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principles stipulated that companies do not have to take a charge against their earnings 
for rent payments made for unused space unless they adopt a formal 'facility exit plan', 
the new regulations require a company to write off the cost of unused or underutilized 
office space as soon as the company terminates the lease or physically 'ceases using' the 
space (Rich 2003). Offering space for sublease on the market is a clear indication of 
unused space in the definition of the GAAP. It is thus expected that many companies will 
avoid recording the write-offs thereby aggravating the general problem of understated 
vacancy in office market space accounting. A quantitative analysis of the expected effect 
of the new GAAP is not, however, available to date.  
Since there are no direct measures of the volume of shadow space, estimates must be 
inferred from other indicators. Typically, a large percentage of sublet space in a market is 
indicative of a related amount of shadow space, even though it is not possible to quantify 
the relationship accurately. Figure 2 illustrates that the share of sublet space rose 
dramatically in the second half of 2000 at a time when the direct vacancy rate was 
relatively low and asking rents still growing, indicating an impending shift in overall 
vacancy and rents. The progression of the indicators over time reveals that sublet space is 
a leading market indicator that captures the turning point in the market cycle three to 
four quarters prior to a change in rental rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Vacant space as a percentage of overall office space inventory (left) and sublet space as 
a percentage of overall vacant space (right). Data: Grubb & Ellis 
Percent vacant space Percent sublet of total vacant 
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The relationship between direct vacant space and sublet space is of particular relevance 
for understanding the market mechanisms of commercial real estate. It is noteworthy that 
the share of sublet space in total vacant space more than tripled within one year (from 
the third quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2001). In general, the more sudden and 
unexpected a recession is, the higher the amount of sublet space put on the market will 
be. This phenomenon became evident in the Manhattan office market at the end of a 
prolonged growth period. When the market unexpectedly started to soften at the end of 
2000, many tenants realized that some of the space they had leased would not be 
required in the near future, and they made a large proportion of the excess space 
available for sublease. The third quarter of 2001 marks a peak in the percentage of sublet 
space. The additional amount of sublet space, however, not only is an indicator of 
weakened demand but also reflects the expectations of tenants with excess space tohat 
they would sublet some of it to displaced World Trade Center tenants. Thus, tenants with 
unused space in their portfolio were more apt to offer sublet space on the market in the 
wake of the 9/11 attack than would have otherwise been the case. In the following 
quarters, the percentage of sublet space decreased as leases expired, direct vacancies 
increased, and tenants withdrew some of the available sublet space from the market.  
 
Apart from the fact that displaced tenants were accommodated in a firm's existing space 
portfolio, the strongly negative absorption in the aftermath of 9/11 has also been caused 
by the fact that displaced companies rented less space than they had occupied in the 
damaged or destroyed buildings. Table 2 demonstrates this phenomenon for a subset of 
6.4 million square feet for which both tenant and building information was available 
(Grubb & Ellis 2002). Backfill is not considered in this subset. Grouped by submarkets, the 
data show on average that companies rented only about 15 percent less space in the new 
buildings than they originally held in the affected buildings.  
 
A further reason for reduced space usage by displaced tenants at their new locations is 
price elasticity of demand. The observed reduction in newly leased space by displaced 
tenants was particularly strong in high-priced buildings and submarkets, such as the Plaza 
District or Grand Central (Table 2). Relatively high rents in some submarkets had an 
additional dampening effect on the amount of space leased by displaced companies. In 
turn, the reduced space usage contributed to higher vacancy rates and declining asking 
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rents in the following quarters. The aggregated demand elasticity of the World Trade 
Center tenants in the destination submarkets is -1.12. The aggregate price elasticity of 
demand is calculated here as the quotient of the percentage change in rented space and 
the percentage change in average rental rates. The basis of the comparison are the 
average rents paid at the original WTC location versus rental rates at new locations 
weighted by the amount of space that the tenant held in the WTC. Typically, demand for 
space is considered rather inelastic in the short run. For example, Wheaton, Torto and 
Evans (1995) and Wheaton (1999) assume a general price elasticity of demand of -0,4 in 
the office market. Owing to the particular circumstances of the 9/11 attack, displaced 
tenants were forced to sign new leases in the various submarkets during a macroeconomic 
recession, when price sensitivity is particularly high. While it is difficult to separate the 
contribution to reduced space demand of recession-related employment layoffs from a 
‘true’ price elasticity effect, the cross-sectional data presented in Table 2 suggest an 
inverse relationship between submarket prices and space reduction. 
 
Table 2: Former WTC/WFC tenants by destination submarket (new leases only) 
Submarket 
 
Occupied space old 
(sq.ft.) 
Occupied space new 
(sq.ft.) 
Difference 
(%) 
Average rent 
($) 
Typical floorplate 
(sq.f.) 
Plaza District 817,496 355,724 -56.49 39.87 22,294 
Grand Central 619,470 481,733 -22.23 38.44 23,190 
Hudson Square/Tribeca 60,000 80,000 33.33 33.00 65,828 
Madison Square 1,142,482 923,911 -19.13 19.17 18,705 
Midtown West 2,351,352 2,299,163 -2.22 19.75 19,578 
Penn Station 578,800 472,000 -18.45 22.30 67,308 
Wall Street 843,404 793,500 -5.92 25.38 10,881 
Total 6,413,004 5,406,031 -15.70 32.22 25,981 
Data: Grubb & Ellis (2002), CoStar (2001) 
 
In summary, the most unanticipated effect in the aftermath of 9/11 has been the fact 
that the expected surge in additional space consumption attributable to the leasing 
activities of displaced tenants did not occur. Backfill of displaced tenants into existing 
leased space, employee layoffs, and reduced space usage per worker as evidenced by a 
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relatively elastic demand for surrogate space are the three most important reasons for 
this. As a consequence, predictions of increasing rents and extreme space shortages did 
not come true because they were based on the simplistic calculation that constant 
demand after a 10 percent reduction in supply would bring the vacancy rate to almost 
zero. On balance, however, absorption in the Manhattan market was overall negative 
because the wider economic recession and the indirect effects of 9/11 more than offset 
the positive absorption of space induced by displaced WTC tenants.  
 
The impact on office employment and locational behavior  
The employment dynamics of office-based service industries are a main determinant of 
the demand for office space and an integral part of contemporary metropolitan 
economies. This is particularly true for Manhattan, where FIRE (finance, insurance and 
real estate) and other office-using industries account for over 40 percent of the total 
employment. In Lower Manhattan, office jobs make up approximately 75 percent of all 
jobs. The importance of these jobs for the local economy, however, is even greater than 
the primary employment statistics suggest. When taking into account local multiplier 
linkages of the FIRE sector, one employee in the financial industry supports two further 
jobs in various types of economic activities, such as business services and restaurants 
(NYC Partnership and Chamber of Commerce 2001, 11).  
 
To assess the dynamics of office employment in the context of 9/11 adequately, empirical 
datasets are analyzed at three levels. First, I examine the regional context of office 
employment dynamics for spatial shifts of agglomeration economies. The second step is 
analyzing Manhattan office industries at the zip code level to determine which submarkets 
were hit hardest by the attack. Third, I trace the relocation patterns of the displaced 
World Trade Center tenants. The observed relocation patterns of the displaced companies 
can provide valuable clues in our attempt to estimate the longer-term reverberations of 
the attack on the locational behavior of office companies. If the companies that were 
immediately affected by the attack chose to remain within the office districts of 
Manhattan, there is reason to assume that the long-term negative impact of the 9/11 
attack was not as powerful as it would be when displaced companies choose to disperse to 
peripheral locations.  
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Other analysts have disagreed on the implications of the attack for the future of 
Manhattan and particularly Lower Manhattan. Some authors claim that 9/11 has had no 
significant lasting impact on the city (for example Harrigan and Martin 2002), but others 
envisage a downward spiral that will eventually lead the demise of Lower Manhattan and 
some of the older inner-city office clusters. Those who take the latter view claim that 
even before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, New York's financial district 
was an 'anachronism' whose economic viability could only be artificially maintained by 
massive government subsidies (Glaeser and Shapiro 2001). Arguing that the direct and 
indirect damage caused by the 9/11 attack created a need for even more subsidies to 
keep Lower Manhattan alive, they conclude that it might not be justified to attempt 
saving the area at all because the public funds needed for this endeavor might be spent 
more efficiently elsewhere. On the other hand, Lower Manhattan has experienced 
considerable economic growth in the years preceding the attack, thereby demonstrating 
that the area’s structural problems are in principle curable. Before reliable conclusions on 
this highly controversial topic can be drawn, however, it is necessary to provide some 
background on the long-term locational behavior of service industries and office 
employment in various parts of the New York metropolitan area in which the effects of 
the 9/11 attack are embedded.  
 
Spatially disaggregated analysis of employment impacts 
Estimates of the total number of jobs lost because of the catastrophic events of 
September 11 differ considerably depending on research methodology and time frame of 
the analysis. Jason Bram, James Orr and Carol Rapaport (2002) applied an autoregressive 
forecasting model and arrived at an estimate of initial job losses in the amount of 38,000 
to 46,000 in October 2001. Although the exact number of lost jobs is difficult to assess, it 
is clear that office-using industries were hit particularly hard by the attack.  
This section explores the dynamics of office employment after September 11 in various 
Manhattan submarkets. While almost all areas of Manhattan have been affected by the 
economic recession and subsequent declines in the number of office jobs, Lower 
Manhattan has sustained particularly great losses because of the double impact of the 
9/11 attack and the macroeconomic recession. The attack of September 11 ended a 
period of sustained strong job growth in Lower Manhattan, turning the overall balance 
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from 2000 until 2003 negative. Besides the World Trade Center area, the sharpest relative 
decline in office employment occurred in the neighborhoods formerly dubbed 'Silicon 
Alley' – in particular Chelsea – as a consequence of the collapse of the dot-com boom. 
More surprisingly, the submarkets in the eastern section of the Midtown market –including 
the Plaza District, which is the highest priced area of Manhattan– saw their shares in 
Manhattan office employment diminish to varying degrees. In contrast, the western areas 
of Midtown exhibit relative growth in office employment; a large part of Manhattan's new 
office space was built in the Times Square and Columbus Circle areas. In the Downtown 
area, sharp losses in the World Trade Center area are juxtaposed with relative gains in the 
eastern financial district and north of the World Trade Center area in Tribeca. Although 
these areas have not been major recipients of displaced WTC tenants, it seems likely that 
temporary locational shifts of office companies away from the western area of Lower 
Manhattan to the east and north contributed to their relative increase. Nevertheless, 
almost all areas of Manhattan lost office jobs in absolute numbers. Since this happened to 
varying degrees, however, relative shares in overall office employment increased even if 
office employment in absolute numbers decreases.  
 
The loss to Lower Manhattan's economy as outlined in the previous sections becomes even 
clearer when considering the displaced tenants of the World Trade Center attack. DRI-
WEFA (2002, 36) estimates that approximately seventy thousand jobs were lost as a 
consequence of the attack, whereof thirty thousand are estimated to be displaced 
permanently. Taking into account that each of these jobs supports other jobs, for 
example in the financial sector through economic linkages to the business and hospitality 
services sector, a complete economic recovery of Lower Manhattan is bound to be a 
difficult long-term endeavor. The overall employment prospects may be more positive as 
these initial job loss assessments suggest, simply because new companies are attracted by 
the positive locational profile of Lower Manhattan. Additional business incentives and tax 
benefits are available through a number of government programs, which enhance lower 
Manhattan's reputation as an attractive business location. Incoming new tenants attracted 
by lower rents and government incentives are bound to fill the vacancies created by those 
displaced tenants who are not returning to their original locations in Lower Manhattan. It 
remains unclear, however, how long it will take to achieve a new market balance in the 
Downtown area.  
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In the wake of the September 11 attack, some have argued that the collapse of the twin 
towers was definite proof that skyscrapers are 'an experimental building topology that has 
failed' (Peirce 2001) and have prophesied the eventual demise of dense Central Business 
Districts characterized by office high-rises. Contrary to these predictions, the relocation 
patterns of displaced World Trade Center firms and other developments after 9/11 
demonstrated that agglomeration economies, the underlying invisible forces that created 
and sustain dense urban environments like Manhattan's, are surprisingly resilient. Outside 
of Lower Manhattan, companies displaced by the 9/11 attack relocated mainly in other 
high-density office submarkets in Manhattan. As outlined in the previous section, Midtown 
Manhattan captured the majority of displaced tenants who moved away from Lower 
Manhattan.  
 
Relocation patterns of displaced WTC tenants 
The data presented in the preceding section suggest that urbanization economies were 
relevant in the location decision of companies displaced by the 9/11 attack since the 
share of displaced tenants in a particular area corresponds roughly with the overall size of 
the respective target area. Comparing GINI values of the overall distribution of office 
firms and the displaced WTC tenants shows that they are more concentrated in Manhattan 
than office employment in general (GINI of 0.48 versus 0.33 for overall office 
employment). This finding runs contrary to the notion that WTC tenants spread out to 
low-profile locations after the 9/11 attack to escape possible future attack and adds 
further evidence to the relevance of urbanization economies in the dispersal process after 
September 11. 
To further explore the relevance of localization economies, the destinations of the former 
World Trade Center tenants who left the Lower Manhattan area are broken down by both 
industry and submarket in Figure 3. The charts demonstrate that most companies chose to 
relocate to the largest existing cluster of their respective industry, thereby roughly 
mirroring the overall distribution of their industry sector across the submarkets. This is in 
part corroborated by the correlation coefficients (Spearman's rho) which compare the 
rank order of submarkets for an industry with the rank order of submarkets for just the 
displaced WTC tenants of the same industry. While the distribution is far from perfect it 
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lends sufficient support to the claim that localization economies have also played an 
important role in the relocation decisions of displaced WTC tenants. A further 
complication is that urbanization economies and localization economies cannot be 
separated sufficiently in this analysis since the core of Midtown is not only the largest 
overall office submarket within Manhattan but also hosts the largest share of many office-
using industries, thus making it difficult to distinguish between the overall size effect and 
the industry-specific effect. In this respect, it is interesting to focus on some of the 
industries that are concentrated in smaller submarkets such as architects or 
communication services. The data on these industries reveal that the WTC companies 
displaced by the 9/11 attack were more likely to move to submarkets with an existing 
cluster of the respective industry as opposed to moving to the largest overall office 
cluster (Midtown Core). These findings give some preliminary clues about the relevance of 
both urbanization and localization economies in the wake of the September 11 attack.  
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Figure 3: General distribution of selected industries in Manhattan submarkets and destinations of 
displaced World Trade Center tenants (Spearman's ρ indicated in lower left corner). Data: Kelly 
(2002), Grubb & Elllis (2002) 
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The impact on rents 
As demonstrated by the data presented in the previous section, displaced tenants 
were not led merely by cost considerations in their relocation decisions. The 
aggregated dataset as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that companies did not 
simply migrate to areas where office space was readily available at the cheapest 
prices but gravitated towards existing agglomerations of the respective industry. The 
resiliency of agglomeration effects in the face of the 9/11 attack which had nurtured 
concerns of a catalyzed dispersion of office firms to remote locations, bodes well for 
the ability of New York City to retain the industries that form its economic base. 
 
Before estimating the impact of 9/11 on overall market rents and subsets of office 
buildings, we examine the spatial differentiation of Manhattan's submarkets over time. 
Being by far the largest office market in the United States, and arguably the second 
largest office market in the world (after Tokyo), Manhattan’s wide range of 
specialized business and financial services as well as the array of building types and 
locations, generate effects in the submarkets that reflect the particular industry mix 
of tenants and the building characteristics. Figure 4 shows a boxplot of the rental 
rates of the fifteen Manhattan submarkets in relation to overall aggregate market 
rents over a period of about twelve years. The horizontal reference line represents the 
average Manhattan rent and the vertical reference lines delineate the areas of 
Midtown (left), Midtown South (center), and Downtown (right). The boxplot shows the 
quartiles of the distribution for each submarket. The length of the box represents the 
difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the rent distribution relative to 
the Manhattan aggregate. It may seem surprising at first sight that the median values 
of all but three submarkets are below the Manhattan average. This can be explained, 
however, by the fact that about half of Manhattan’s office space is concentrated in 
just three Midtown submarkets with above average values.  
 
The height distribution of the columns in the boxplot resembles a longitudinal cross-
section of Manhattan’s built environment. This pattern is in line with urban economic 
theory, which states that the physical density of the built environment is a function of 
the bid rents in the area. Apart from the differences in median rent, the submarkets 
also differ in the volatility of rents over time, as illustrated by the spread of the 
quartiles. In general, the established Midtown and Downtown office core locations 
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exhibit less variability in office rent over time than the more peripheral locations of 
Midtown-South. The greater volatility of rents in Gramercy Park, Chelsea, Soho or 
Tribeca can be attributed to the 'dotcom' boom of the late 1990s when more than one 
thousand technology-related start-up companies settled in these hitherto peripheral 
office locations. Soon after the precipitous fall of technology share prices and the 
subsequent demise of many start-up companies in the district in the year 2000, rents 
also began to decline to previous levels and few areas were able to retain a significant 
share of office companies.  
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Figure 4: Boxplot of submarket rents relative to the overall Manhattan office market from Q1-
1992 through Q1-2004 (index, Manhattan=100). Data: Grubb & Ellis.  
 
Among the submarkets in the established office cores of Midtown and Downtown, the 
World Trade Center area (which today comprises about seventeen million square feet 
of office space in the World Financial Center and a number of other office buildings in 
the vicinity of the World Trade Center site) shows the greatest volatility. An analysis 
of the rent time series reveals that this volatility is attributable to a particularly steep 
decline in rents in the first half of the 1990s, possibly exacerbated by the first 
Midtown Midtown South Downtown 
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terrorist attack on the WTC building complex, a subsequent sharp increase in rents in 
the second half of the 1990s; and a dramatic decline in the wake of 9/11, with a 
partial recovery in the more recent quarters.  
 
Afraid of heights? Tall buildings before and after 9/11  
The 9/11 attack had a unequal impact on various spatial submarkets, as the preceding 
section demonstrates. A further assumption to be investigated is that tenants would 
shun prominent skyscrapers in response to the 9/11 attack. The susceptability of 
famous buildings and very tall buildings to terrorist attack in the future might lead 
tenants in search of office space to move to low-height and 'low-profile' buildings 
instead of the most prestigious and conspicuous buildings, which were favored 
locations before 9/11. Norman Miller and his colleagues (2003), along with Torto 
Wheaton Research (2002), postulate, however, that these so-called trophy buildings 
are still coveted by both tenants and investors and that there is no flight from tall 
buildings due to psychological reasons and fear of new attack. By analyzing a set of 
seven high-profile trophy buildings, Torto Wheaton Research shows that these 
buildings exhibited below-average vacancy rates one year after the attack. Miller et 
al. (2003) envision, however, that adverse affects will harm the marketability of a few 
truly famous office buildings such as the Empire State Building.  
To test this assumption, it is important to distinguish between 'trophy' buildings and 
'tall' buildings (despite a large overlap of both categories). There are several buildings 
in Manhattan that are considered 'trophy' or 'top-tier' but not all of these buildings are 
in the group of the thirty or even fifty tallest buildings in Manhattan. Conversely, not 
all of the thirty tallest office buildings in Manhattan are considered trophy. As far as a 
discounting of market values for fear of future terrorist attack is concerned, it is 
simply the height of an office building that evokes concerns about being the target of 
another terrorist attack rather than the rating of a building by brokerage professionals 
or any measures of value and rental income. Figure 5 compares the vacancy rates of 
two sets of buildings (forty or more stories and fifty or more stories) extracted from 
the CoStar (2001) building database. The samples are weighted by rentable building 
area. The vacancy rate which is a leading indicator and thus more appropriate to 
reveal trends than rental rates, shows that the tallest buildings (fifty or more stories) 
in particular recorded a sharp hike in vacancies after 9/11.  
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Despite the fact that vacancy rates declined and approached the values of the average 
market in the following quarters, they still remain above market average and 
significantly above rates for buildings forty or more stories high. The difference 
becomes even more pronounced when fifty-story-or-higher buildings are eliminated 
from the forty-story-plus subset of buildings. The category of buildings between forty 
and forty-nine stories high shows significantly lower vacancies for these buildings. In 
general, it is evident that the expected flight of tenants from tall office buildings did 
not occur in the first three years following the attack. The data point to a potential 
problem for the tallest office buildings (fifty stories or higher), at least in the first 
three years following the attack. This might be attributed to a psychological effect 
among office tenants perceiving some of the tallest structures in the city as potential 
targets of terrorist attack and seeking to avoid them, but the impact of this effect on 
overall vacancy in the affected buildings appears to be small and is likely to dissipate 
barring another incidence involving tall office buildings.  
 
Figure 5: Vacancy rates in office buildings of various heights. Data: CoStar 
 
A list of the destinations of displaced tenants published by Grubb & Ellis (2002) reveals 
that most tenants in the database moved to buildings with more than twenty, but 
fewer than forty stories. A smaller percentage moved to buildings with forty to forty-
nine stories, and a few large tenants decided to move to buildings with fifty or more 
50+ Stories 
40+ Stories 
All buildings 
Vacancy rate (%) 
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stories. Overall, only a small share of the displaced tenants contained in the 
subsample moved to non-skyscraper buildings (i.e. buildings with fewer than twenty 
stories). These findings underline the conclusion that there is no clear evidence of an 
aversion effect for either tenants in general or the group that was immediately 
affected by the attack. 
 
The impact on building values and sales transactions 
Beyond the destruction of human lives, the September 11 attack also resulted in a 
massive destruction of capital values. The market value of the destroyed World Trade 
Center was assessed at $4 billion and the replacement cost estimated at $6 billion (not 
including excavation, infrastructure repair, environmental costs, internal finish, 
telecommunication and other technological equipment). The total cost for restoring 
the damaged space in the World Trade Center is estimated at $2.2 billion (New York 
City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce 2001, 74).  
One of the most remarkable and unexpected phenomena in the wake of 9/11 was the 
significant increase in sales prices per square foot, despite widespread speculations 
that falling rents, rising vacancies, and a growing aversion to working in high-rise 
office buildings would drive prices down dramatically. Simultaneously, average 
capitalization rates of Central Business District (CBD) office buildings (closed rates) 
continuously declined from about 9 percent in the third quarter of 2001 to 7.57 
percent in the third quarter of 2004. Figure 6 shows the increase in sales prices after 
September 11, despite worsening market fundamentals and the overall economic 
recession. One particularly notable case is the sale of the General Motors Building in 
Manhattan in September 2003 for $1.4 billion ($764 per square foot), the highest price 
ever paid for an office building.  
The rise in property values has been attributed to historically low interest rates and 
the fact that real estate is still considered a "safe haven" in times of economic and 
political uncertainty (Reis 2003). Large capital flows into office real estate and the 
sizable portion of international and domestic investors looking to purchase class A 
office buildings in prime locations put additional upward pressure on prices in the 
high-quality segment of inner city office markets. It appears that the downward 
pressure on capitalization rates exerted by the extremely low level of interest rates 
was stronger than the upward pressure induced by weak market fundamentals (Torto 
Wheaton Research 2002). Although the complex interaction of interest rates, sales 
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prices, and capitalization rates in the wake of 9/11 cannot be adequately considered 
in this paper, the apparent disconnect between market fundamentals and sales prices 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks deserve further investigation in order to arrive at 
a more comprehensive understanding of these effects.  
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Figure 6: Average sales price per square foot for office properties in Manhattan (n=183). 
Data: Real Capital Analytics 
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Conclusions and further work 
More than seven years after the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001, there is scant evidence that the attack will have a long-lasting impact on the 
Manhattan office market.  
 
The Manhattan office market as a whole does not show any signs of lasting economic 
damage. Of the companies that decided not to return to Lower Manhattan after 9/11, 
the majority relocated to Midtown Manhattan. An industry analysis demonstrated that 
both urbanization and localization economies were at play in the relocation process 
and that companies preferred to settle in preexisting large industry clusters in 
Manhattan. Taken together, the core markets of Midtown and Downtown Manhattan 
captured about 80 percent of the stream of displaced tenants after 9/11, while areas 
outside of these two core clusters captured only 20 percent, which bodes well for 
Manhattan’s ability to remain a prime office location even in the face of a severe 
crisis.  
 
To be sure, a more decentralized development of office space and a more dynamic 
increase in office workers in the wider CMSA region outside of Manhattan – a process 
that has been evolving for at least two decades – is likely to continue over the next 
years. Although security concerns are likely to accelerate this development at least 
temporarily as firms seek to create backup facilities and distribute key functions 
across various locations to protect their operations, preliminary analysis of the period 
after 9/11 shows that agglomeration economies and firm efficiency criteria are 
restraining and mitigating such dispersion tendencies in Manhattan. Moreover, 
Manhattan has clearly been able to retain a competitive productivity advantage in the 
office-using industries. In fact, Manhattan’s productivity differential in the office-
using industries over both the national and the regional average has continued to 
increase even since 9/11. 
 
Lower Manhattan has demonstrated considerable progress in overcoming this crisis 
both physically and economically. A total of 31.1 million square feet of office space 
were affected in Lower Manhattan, of which 14.8 were destroyed and 19.6 million 
damaged and eventually restored. The affected space makes up less than 10 percent 
of the total inventory of New York City but accounts for roughly 60 percent of 
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Downtown's Class A space. The sudden loss of more than 100,000 jobs and of a large 
portion of its office inventory sent Lower Manhattan, which had been struggling for 
much of the last three decades, into a severe economic crisis.  
 
However, the majority of businesses directly affected by the attack have opted to 
remain in the Downtown area or have returned there after the damaged buildings 
were restored. The rebuilding process is well under way, and the first office tower to 
be rebuilt on the World Trade Center site, Building 7, with 52 stories and 1.7 million 
square feet of office space, was delivered to the market in 2007. Rental rates and 
building vacancies seem to have stabilized after the Lower Manhattan market 
weakened dramatically in the quarters following 9/11. 
 
Despite the progress made to date, the Lower Manhattan office market faces some 
serious challenges for the next few years. Office employment in the area is 
considerably lower than it was before the 9/11 attack, and it remains to be seen 
whether the losses can be fully recovered before the completion of the rebuilding 
process around 2015. Considering that the area has traditionally been more volatile 
due to the dominance of finance and technology industries, a full recovery is possible 
once these key sectors demonstrate sustained job growth again. In the long run, 
however, it is critical that for Lower Manhattan diversify its economy and attract a 
broader cross-section of office-using industries to the area.  
 
Among the most notable phenomena found in this paper is the downward correction in 
occupied space across Manhattan when displaced tenants had the choice of leasing 
new space after 9/11. On the aggregate, companies rented about 15 percent less 
space than they had occupied in the World Trade Center. Space reduction was 
particularly pronounced in high-priced buildings and submarkets, such as Park Avenue 
or Grand Central. Moreover, the set of so-called "trophy" buildings proved to be less 
affected by the recession than the general market, a finding that runs counter to 
initial assumptions about the future of office high-rises. Only the tallest buildings in 
the city (fifty or more stories) exhibited slightly higher vacancies after 9/11, arguably 
because of an aversion to the very tallest and most famous structures in the city as 
potential targets of further terrorist attack.  
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In addition to a drastic reduction in leased space, accommodation of displaced tenants 
within the existing office space portfolio of large companies contributed further to 
lower occupancy rates than had been expected after the destruction of 10 percent of 
the inventory. This phenomenon, also known as backfill, caused overall absorption to 
be negative in the quarters following 9/11, since the positive demand created by 
displaced tenants was more than offset by losses incurred in the accelerated 
recession. Positive absorption of approximately 7 million square feet of office space in 
various submarkets of Manhattan can be attributed to tenants who were displaced by 
the 9/11 attack. This figure is much lower than expected given the square footage of 
the destroyed buildings. Approximately half of the anticipated demand dissipated 
trough backfill into existing space, reduced staff, subleasing, and more economical 
space usage per office worker. 
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